The 1997 Israeli helicopter disaster: the methods of questioning following fatal accident

זירת האסון, פברואר 1997. צילום ארכיון.

Seventeen years after the disaster, the IAF continues to work on advanced research culture. Top safety Commander: “the inquiry is part of a constant iochltheno to improve, strive for zero casualties.”

תאריך: 02/04/2014, 14:06    
מחבר: דניאל חסון ואלעד הלפרין, אתר צה”ל

חיל האוויר

On February 4, 1997, 73 soldiers were killed in the collision of two CH-53 helicopters,
Over the Hula Valley. 8 of whom were aircrew who flew the soldiers and other fighters from the Brigade and other units which destination would IDF outposts in South Lebanon security zone.

The helicopter crashed in an area where other, monument to the unknown since
The כ”אסון. Until 2002 it was fatal helicopter accident in human history.

17 years later, the air force continues and intensifies its investigation capabilities, and
Learn continuously from accidents to ensure no air disasters, and to minimize the number of mistakes. “The price of a mistake is critical to people’s lives, and hurt the war mochnotheno”, explains the head of Chief safety and quality control (Beck) in the air force, Colonel, fighter pilot and Squadron commander. “The air force we strive not to be wrong, because it’s not feasible, but not to repeat the same mistake twice.”

Air force pilots are taught to question their first day at school for flight, and this skill is accompanied them throughout their service in the army. After all, where the research was conducted flight pilots present the successes and failures of her emerged, while emphasis on targeted research that has clear goals and objectives. “It is important to define what we want to improve the next day,” says Colonel NIR. “We set measurable goals which can be questioned.

Before the flight, using a “risk management”, trying to find
And to identify hazards and establish process required is the Mission of minimizing the risks as much as possible. “We are trying to assess what the risks are for a specific task, how serious a particular risk and what the potential for its occurrence,” adds Beck head.

In the past, caused 80 percent of aircraft accidents due to technical failures. Today, with advances in technology, most mistakes are human errors. In the past against such errors called “rotten apple”: she directs the recording was a failure or accident to person (i.e., the pilot), and argues that if we treat the person, and solve the problem.

The new approach tries to find the reason behind the failure. “We seek always to ask why these people, who are the best people we have making these mistakes,” says Colonel NIR.

For example, a case in which a plane met in pelicans flying in the sky. The pilot thought the engine shuts down and in less than 50 seconds from the moment we met the band he landed on the ground. It was an exceptional event that pilots very admired. “Although the situation ended positively started to investigate the incident, and the Navigator and pilot,
Says Beck head. “asked whether they did everything that was supposed to do, have them properly chshrano the situation, do their work wasn’t good, was it about right with the command tower, etc. We analyze the first tier of the pilots, and the air force shell gave them. “

In the 80s the air force lost approximately 26 aircraft throughout the year. In the past decade lost applies
Two air planes only. “Compared to other forces our situation very well,” says Colonel NIR testifies. “But the goal is to achieve zero casualties.”

“First and foremost we strive that Warrior wants to move forward on a personal level,” says head of bak. “in addition, we strive for integrity and transparency to get honest inquiry,” he added. “In addition, there must be tolerance for mistakes. We create a culture that enables
Put mistakes. If you make any mistake, we will punish the pilots realize very quickly that it’s better not to expose mistakes. “

Translated from Hebrew